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IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At the outset, Cross-Appellants (collectively, "MRIA") want to make clear that the trial
court was given an extraordinarily difficult task. As this Court may already know, after it issued
its 2009 decision, Cross-Respondents (collectively, "St. AI's"), chose to disqualify the first trial
judge, Judge McLaughlin. As a result, the current trial judge, Judge Wetherell, was forced to
jump in the middle of this hotly contested case, which meant he had to quickly get up to speed on
the mountain of facts, arguments, and decisions which took place during the five years of
litigation prior to his involvement, and then had to take all those facts, arguments, and
decisions-including this Court's opinion-and try to determine how they would affect his task
going forward. And he did all of that in a case whose trial lasted for eight straight weeks, and
which featured dozens of witnesses, over a thousand admitted exhibits, and scores of new
motions. Given the enormous size and complexity of this matter, MRIA wants to be clear that
regardless of the outcome of this appeal process, the trial court did a truly impressive job in
extremely trying circumstances.
All that said, MRIA also believes that the trial court erred when it made the decisions
outlined below. In particular, the trial court erred by failing to nullify Judge McLaughlin's
departing partner share award even though this Court's decision in Saint Alphonsus Diversified

Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,224 P.3d 1068 (2009) (hereinafter, "SADC')
eviscerated Judge McLaughlin's ruling. The trial court also erred by awarding post-judgment
interest to St. AI's from 2007 even though judgment was not entered in favor ofS1. AI's until
2012. With respect to post-judgment interest, the trial court erred by awarding interest before
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offsetting MRIA and St. AI'sjudgments. The trial court further erred by dismissing, on
summary judgment, MRIA's claim for withdrawal in breach of the partnership agreement by
wrongly deciding that RUPA displaced MRIA's common law claim for breach of contract.
Additionally, the trial court erred by dismissing, on summary judgment, MRIA's claim for
wrongful dissociation before the end of the partnership term or particular undertaking because
there was a fact issue that the jury should have resolved concerning whether the partnership was
for a term or particular undertaking. Finally, the trial court erred by granting St. AI's motion for
a directed verdict on MRIA' s claim for profits related to Eagle because, contrary to the trial
court's decision, that claim was not too remote.
These erroneous decisions had more than just theoretical implications for MRIA-in
some cases, the trial court's holdings cost MRIA several millions in damages. MRIA
accordingly seeks review of these decisions now.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Most of the facts relevant to MRIA's Cross-Appeal have already been presented in
MRIA's "Respondents' Brief," filed contemporaneously herewith and in opposition to St. AI's
"Appellant's Brief." Rather than restate the facts contained in that brief verbatim, MRIA will,
for the most part, simply incorporate them herein and supplement them as need be in the
arguments below. That said, because facts relative to St. AI's usurpation of the MRIA's Eagle
opportunity are not presented in that brief, they are discussed below.
In 2001, the CEO of one ofMRIA's business, MRI Mobile ("Mobile"), made a
presentation to MRIA board, which included St. AI's representatives. Tr.,3908:5-3909:5;
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3910: 13-16. In that presentation, he described business opportunities in Eagle and Meridian. Id
This was not the first time MRIA raised with St. AI's the issue of opening facilities in Eagle and
Meridian. Id at 3909: 1-5. At the presentation, the CEO explained that there was growth
occurring in Eagle and Meridian, and that it was important to get to these areas first. Id at
3908:12-15. Consequently, Mobile's CEO expressed a sense of urgency about getting Mobile
into the Eagle and Meridian areas as St. Luke's and IMI were expanding rapidly. Id at 3908:1519. This sense of urgency was not shared by St. AI's. Id at 3908:19-21. Indeed, St. AI's was
strongly opposed to such an expansion. Id at 3909:10-3910:16. Consequently, MRIA did not
build facilities in Eagle and Meridian while St. AI's was a partner because MRIA would never
make any major moves like this without the agreement of the hospital partners. Tr., 182: 11183:4,199:22-200:8,3906:3-3917:5. By the time St. AI's withdrew, however, MRIA was no
longer in the position to take advantage of new opportunities, but instead was trying to salvage
what remained. Tr.,4032:25-4034:3. In fact, the evidence shows that Saint Alphonsus thwarted
Mobile's growth, so that IMI could reach those markets instead of, or ahead of, MRIA. In that
regard, St. AI's CFO, Cindy Schamp, stated at a MRIA board meeting that St. AI's "clearly
do[ es] not have the same goals as MRI Mobile, they are not going in the same direction and
although this board has served them well historically, Saint Alphonsus has different objectives
for the future. As a result, they are not interested in perpetuating the growth ofMRI Mobile."
Ex. 4221 at 3. Thereafter, St. AI's, through its new partnership, IMI, opened a highly lucrative
imaging center in Eagle. Exs. 5067, 5089.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL
MRIA presents the following issues for cross-appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in
awarding St. AI's a judgment of $4,600,000; (2) whether the trial court erred in its award of
interest on St. AI's judgment; (3) whether the trial court erred in the manner it calculated its
offset of St. AI's judgment against MRIA's judgment; (4) whether the trial court erred when it
dismissed, on summary judgment, MRIA's claim for withdrawal in breach of the partnership
agreement by wrongly deciding that RUPA displaced MRIA's common law claim for breach of
contract; (5) whether the trial court erred when it dismissed, on summary judgment, MRIA's
claim for wrongful dissociation before the end of the partnership term because there was a fact
issue that the jury should have resolved concerning whether the partnership was for a term; and
(6) whether the trial court erred when it excluded the damages concerning profits stolen by IMI's
Eagle, Idaho facility. These issues are discussed in order below.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Court is undoubtedly very familiar with the general course of proceedings for this
matter, which is stated in MRIA's "Respondents' Brief." As it relates to the issues in this
particular cross-appeal, after the SADC decision from this Court, the specific course of
proceedings is as follows:
•

On November 16,2010, in response to one of St. AI's many motions for summary
judgment, the trial court ruled as a matter of law that the MRIA partnership agreement
was not for a term or particular undertaking. R.,556-62.
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•

On May 6,2011, in response to another ofSt. AI's motions for summary judgment, the
trial court dismissed MRIA's claim for withdrawal in breach of the partnership
agreement, ruling that the Revised Uniform Partnership Agreement, or "RUP A,"
displaced common law contract theories. R., 1236-38.

•

On June 17, 2011, in response to yet another of St. AI's motions for summary judgment,
the trial court decided that St. AI's offsetting departing partner share award from the first
trial, which the first trial court based on RUPA instead of the contract, was the law of the
case. R.,1377-78. This ruling also explicitly served as the basis for the trial court's posttrial decisions: (1) to award St. AI's interest as of 2007 (even though jUdgment was not
entered until 2012); and (2) to perform the offset ofSt. Ai's and MRIA'sjudgments only
after interest had accrued for five years, rather than before. R, 5030-32.

•

Finally, during trial, on October 25,2011, in response to a motion for directed verdict
filed by St. AI's, the trial court ruled that MRIA could not recover any damages related to
St. Ai's usurpation ofMRIA's profits through its IMI Eagle facility. Tr.,6068:246070:10.
ARGUMENT

I.

St. AI's Departing Partner Share Should be Limited to Its Capital Account.
When this Court issued its decision in this matter in 2009, it determined that Article 6.1

of the Articles of Partnership ofMRI Associates (the "Partnership Agreement") was "not an
express provision limiting the right to dissociate rightfully," and that therefore St. AI's
dissociation was not per se wrongful under Idaho's RUPA statutes. SADC, 224 P.3d at 1078.
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Based on this decision, this Court vacated the judgment from the first trial. Id In so doing,
however, this Court also nullified Judge McLaughlin's decision regarding the amount of St. AI's
departing partner share, since both decisions expressly relied on the same contractual
interpretation which this Court found to be erroneous. Judge Wetherell, however, failed to
recognize this nullification and awarded St. AI's millions more for its departing partner share
than he should have. His decision should be reversed.

A.

Background

In the previous trial of this matter, there were at least two issues concerning Articles 6.1
and 6.2 of the Partnership Agreement which are relevant to the present discussion. The first was
whether Article 6.1 "expressly" limited St. AI's right to dissociate. The second was whether the
amount of St. AI's departing partner share was governed by the Partnership Agreement or by
RUP A. These issues were decided by Judge McLaughlin based on his interpretation of these
contractual provisions (2007 R., 2306-13)-an interpretation which this Court has determined
was incorrect. Those provisions provide as follows:
6.1
Conditions of Withdrawal. Any Hospital Partner may withdraw from the
Partnership at any time if, in a Hospital Partner's reasonable judgment, continued
participation in this Partnership: (i) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such
Hospital Partner of its parent of their subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardized
medicare/Medicaid or insurance reimbursement or participations; (iii) if the
business activities of the Partnership are contrary to the ethical principles of the
Roman Catholic Church as designated from time to time; or (iv) is or may be in
violation of any local, state or federal laws, rules or regulations .... Unless
otherwise agreed, the withdrawing Hospital Partner shall only be entitled to
receive its interest in the Partnership an amount which is equal to the balance of
such Hospital Partner's capital account at the time of withdrawal.
Payment for Interest. The price for the withdrawing Hospital Partner's
6.2
interest in the Partnership shall be paid to such Hospital Partner by the Partners to
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which its interest in the Partnership has been allocated, without interest, in
installments equal to, and due at the same time as, distributions of the Net Cash
Flow which the Hospital Partner would have received had it remained a Partner in
the Partnership.
Ex. 4023, §§ 6.1 and 6.2 (emphasis added).
As to the first issue, MRIA argued during the first trial that the terms of the withdrawing
partner's buyout were to be determined by these sections, regardless of whether the withdrawal
was made for one of the enumerated "medical/theological" reasons stated in the first part of
Article 6.1. St. AI's countered that the buyout provision contained in the Partnership Agreement
only applied if it opted to withdraw under one of the circumstances listed in Article 6.1, and then
argued that because St. AI's did not dissociate due to one of those circumstances, its share should
be determined under the more expansive default provision of RUPA. Specifically, St. AI's
argued that I.C. § 53-3-701(b) should apply, which provides that:
The buyout price of a dissociated partner's interest is the amount that would have
been distributable to the dissociating partner under section 53-3-807(b), Idaho
Code, if, on the date of dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a
price equal to the greater of the liquidation value or the value based on a sale of
the entire business as a going concern without the dissociated partner and the
partnership was wound up as of that date. Interest shall be paid from the date of
dissociation to the date of payment.
In response to these arguments, Judge McLaughlin ruled that Articles 6.1 and 6.2:
(1) limited St. AI's ability to rightfully withdraw solely to the four reasons listed therein; and, as
a result, (2) limited the capital account payout-rather than a RUP A payout-solely to a
dissociation based on one of these same four reasons. He stated:
[t]he Court has further examined the type of circumstances outlined in Article 6.1
as permitted reasons for dissociation. Each of these circumstances were subject to
changes in law or medical-theological circumstances beyond the control ofthe
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Hospital partners that could require that hospital partner to dissociate quickly in
order to avoid substantial financial hann to the entire hospital organization based
upon this partnership agreement. Because a quick dissociation might have
significant financial consequences for the partnership due to the debt associated
with this new technology at the time of formation of the partnership, a reduced
"buyout" based upon the four (4) enumerated reasons for dissociation would
allow MRIA to continue without the hospital partner's participation and
significant debt load issues for the partnership. The delay in payment set forth for
payment in Article 6.2 is consistent with the intent of Article 6.1 as outlined
above and further demonstrates that all of these provisions were based upon the
four enumerated reasons for withdrawal as outlined in Article 6.1.
2007 R, 2310. Then, because Judge McLaughlin had already determined that St. AI's had
wrongfully dissociated by not withdrawing for one of the enumerated reasons in Article 6.1, he
applied the more expansive RUPA buyout language in I.C. § 53-3-701(b). 2007 R, 2310-11. As
such, St. AI's award at the first trial was approximately $4.6 million under RUPA, rather than the
far lesser amount under the Partnership Agreement-$863,040. 2007 R., 2306-13.
On appeal, this Court reversed this finding and specifically detennined that Article 6.1
did not "expressly" limit St. AI's right to dissociate solely to the four reasons listed therein.
SADC, 224 P.3d at 1074-80. Thus, on remand, MRIA requested that Judge Wetherell revisit
Judge McLaughlin's ruling concerning the departing partner share now that the stated rationale
of that decision had been entirely reversed by this Court. R,786-98. Simultaneously, St. AI's
filed a motion for summary judgment on the claim alleging that Judge McLaughlin's decision
was the law of the case. R.,940-48. Judge Wetherell agreed with St. AI's and incorrectly ruled
that S1. AI's was entitled to the $4.6 million under RUP A due to the law of the case doctrine. R,
1377-78.
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B.

Judge McLaughlin's Decision Was Not the Law o/the Case Because the
Underpinnings o/that Decision Were Overturned by this Court

Because this Court's decision eviscerated the underpinnings of Judge McLaughlin's
rulings concerning Article 6.1, Judge Wetherell should not have found those rulings to be the law
of the case. "[A] court may 'correct an error in its original findings as to a matter not passed on
by the appellate court,'" Blinzler v. Andrews, 95 Idaho 769, 519 P.2d 438 (1973), or those
matters "which are subsidiary to the actions directed by the appellate court," State v. Hosey, 134
Idaho 883, 886, 11 P .3d 1101, 1104 (2000), even though that issue is not expressly included in
the issues to be addressed on remand. See also Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661, 603 P.2d 995
(1979) ("Upon remand of this case the trial court should determine its findings of fact and
conclusions oflaw, with respect to the issues not dealt with in our opinion, on the basis of the
record in the prior proceedings and such further proceedings as may be had, without being bound
in any way by its prior findings and conclusions on such issues.") (emphasis added).
As set forth above, Article 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement contains provisions relating
to withdrawal from the partnership and to the buyout of the partner's interest upon that
withdrawal. Ex. 4023, § 6.1. Because this Court held that St. AI's may lawfully withdraw under
that agreement for reasons beyond the medical/theological reasons stated in Article 6.1, then, if
Article 6.1 is to be read consistently, the buyout provision therein likewise must also apply when
withdrawal occurs for reasons other than these enumerated medical/theological reasons. If not,
Judge McLaughlin's original determination that "the buyout calculation in Article 6.1 is limited
to those enumerated four (4) reasons for dissociation" (2007 R., 2311 (emphasis added)) results
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in truly bewildering paradox: that Article 6.1 is not limited to the four enumerated circumstances
for purposes of withdrawal but is somehow limited to those four circumstances for purposes of
applying the buyout provision upon that exact same withdrawal. This is obviously nonsensical,
and has no basis in the language of the Agreement.
Indeed, Judge McLaughlin recognized as much at the time he issued his order. Before
his decision regarding the buyout, he made the fateful ruling that St. AI's could lawfully
dissociate from MRIA only if it withdrew for one of the four reasons outlined in Article 6.1.

SADC, 224 P.3d at 1074-80. In his later decision regarding the buyout provision of Article 6.1,
Judge McLaughlin expressly connected the withdrawal provision with the buyout provision,
noting that each of the four circumstances in Article 6.1 gave St. AI's the ability to quickly
withdraw, and that "[b ]ecause a quick dissociation might have significant financial consequences
for the partnership ... a reduced 'buyout' based upon the four (4) enumerated reasons for
dissociation would allow MRIA to continue without the hospital partner's participation and
significant debt load issue for the partnership." 2007 R., 231 0 (emphasis added).
St. AI's cannot have it both ways. Either Article 6.1 is restrictive, or it is not. If
withdrawal can lawfully be accomplished for reasons other than the four enumerated reasons,
then the buyout provision likewise applies in circumstances other than withdrawal for one of
those four reasons.

C.

St. AI's Departing Partner Share Under the Agreement is Millions Less.

The difference between a buyout for dissociation under RUP A and a departing partner
payout under Article 6.1 is significant. Again, based on his erroneous reading of the Partnership
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Agreement, Judge McLaughlin awarded St. AI's approximately $4.6 million for its RUPA
departing partnership share, a decision which Judge Wetherell affirmed. R.,5281-85.
Meanwhile, the undisputed evidence at the previous trial was that a payout under the "capital
account" language of Article 6.1 was $863,040.
The specifics here are worth reviewing. In the 2007 trial, MRIA introduced evidence
through one of its principals, Dr. Prochaska, that the amount ofSt. AI's capital account upon
departure was $863,040. 2007 Tr., 1236:24-1238:10, 1288:11-1289:2; Ex. 4351. That evidence
was not disputed: St. AI's focused its efforts at trial on trying to prove that Articles 6.1 and 6.2
should not apply at all, not that this was an incorrect number ifMRIA's interpretation of those
articles was correct. See 2007 R., 2306-13 (Judge McLaughlin summarizes the evidence in this
regard). As such, in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judge McLaughlin stated that
"[w]hile the Court has no reason to doubt the credibility of Dr. Prochaska's testimony as to his
understanding of the amount of money in SADC's capital account, the Court does not find
Dr. Prochaska's testimony to be well founded as to the parties' intent as to Section 6.1 and 6.2 of
the Partnership Agreement." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, Judge McLaughlin found
that $863,040 was the accurate number if the capital account was the proper measure of
damages, but he disagreed that the capital account was the proper measure of damages. Given
that this Court's decision in SADC makes clear that the capital account is the proper measure of
damages, $863,040 is now the undisputed amount St. AI's is owed for its departing partner share.
Therefore, Judge Wetherell's decision should be remanded with instructions that St. AI's be
awarded $863,040, rather than $4.6 million.
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II.

Regardless of Whether RUPA or the Partnership Agreement is Used, the Trial
Court Awarded Too Much Interest.
The trial court improperly awarded St. AI's interest from 2007 on its $4.6 million

departing partner share at the 2007 judgment rate of interest. R.,5281-85. The trial court's
decision concerning this interest was solely based on its erroneous belief that St. AI's $4.6
million judgment from 2007 was not disturbed by this Court's decision in 2009, and as such, that
St. AI's had a valid judgment upon which to collect interest since that time. R., 1377-78, 503032. This decision was incorrect. Instead, interest should have been awarded, ifat all, as of2012,
when a judgment was entered in favor of St. AI's on its departing partner share. This is true for
at least two reasons.
First, this Court specifically vacated St. AI's award with its SADC decision in 2009.
When Judge McLaughlin issued his judgment in 2007, the awards for both MRIA and St. AI's
were memorialized in the exact same judgment, with St. AI's award only showing up as an offset
to MRIA's award. See 2007 R. 2306-14 (p. 6), 2533-35. This is critical, because when this
Court remanded this matter in 2009, it stated it was "vacat[ing] the judgment"-not part of the
judgment, but the entire judgment. SADC, 224 P.3d at 1090. By definition, this would include
both MRIA's recovery and St. AI's offset, because both were included in this one vacated
judgment. Indeed, St. AI's recognized as much when it moved for summary judgment in 2011
seeking its departing partner share. See R., 940-48. If the 2007 judgment had not been vacated,
it would not have needed to move for summary judgment to have that judgment reinstated. As
such, when the trial court awarded post-judgment interest from 2007, it did so even though there
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was no judgment-for either party-from 2007 upon which to make such an award. This of
course makes no sense: post-judgment interest logically depends on there first being a valid
judgment in existence upon which to accrue interest. See I.C. § 28-22-104 ("The legal rate of
interest on money due on the judgment of any competent court ... ") (emphasis added).
Moreover, while it is true that the trial court eventually decided to simply award the
vacated $4.6 million judgment again, it did not rule on that issue until June 2011 and did not
enter a judgment reflecting the award until January 2012. R., 1375-84,3372-76. Thus, ifpostjudgment interest is to be awarded at all, it can only be awarded as of January 2012 at the
earliest, and at 2012's judgment rate, rather than 2007's. To find otherwise would be to
impermissibly read a non-existent retroactivity clause into the post-judgment interest statute.
The second reason has already been discussed above. Judge Wetherell's finding that the
$4.6 million departing partner share rendered by Judge McLaughlin was not affected by this
Court's 2009 decision is simply incorrect. That is, even ifthis Court had not vacated the entirety
of the judgment with its 2009 decision, there can be no argument that the SADC opinion did
completely vacate the underpinnings of Judge McLaughlin's decision concerning St. AI's
departing partner share. At the risk of repetition, while this Court's finding that Article 6.1 of the
Partnership Agreement cannot be read exclusively was beneficial for St. AI's ability to
"rightfully" dissociate, it also means that the buyout provision in that clause will now apply to
that same allegedly "rightful" dissociation. And again, if this previous judgment itself was
impliedly vacated, any interest assessed upon it would also be void.
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III.

The Trial Court Incorrectly Performed the Offset.
When the trial court performed the offset of St. AI's departing partner share to MRIA's

judgment, it awarded St. AI's five years of interest on its judgment prior to offsetting MRIA's
award. R., 5030-32. However, even if awarding interest since 2007 made sense-and it does
not-the law is clear that the trial court should have reversed that order, offsetting the judgments
first, and then awarding the interest from 2007. 1 MRIA accordingly asks this Court to revisit that
decision.
In particular, to award St. AI's interest on its judgment for five years before performing
an offset would offend the very nature of post-judgment interest. It is black-letter law that the
"purpose of postjudgment interest is to compensate a successful plaintiff for being deprived of
compensation for his or her loss during the time between ascertainment of the damage and
payment by the defendant." CJS INTEREST § 11 0 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical

Corp. v. Bon/orno, 494 U.S. 827, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 108 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1990)). As a result, if a
plaintiffs award is subject to an offset, the interest should only be calculated on the net (rather
than gross) amount, since otherwise, the plaintiff would be "compensate[ed] for being deprived
of compensation" which it was never actually entitled to in the first place. As the Supreme Court
of Maine noted in the related context of recoupment, the opposing claims "must be subtracted
before interest is applied. Otherwise, the plaintiff would collect interest on the part of the

While this argument is specifically aimed at the Fifth Amended Judgment, which assumed that
a departing partner award of $4.6 million was rendered in 2007, and was not thereafter disturbed,
the logic ofMRIA's argument, as described below, would apply to whatever amount that this
Court finds to be the departing partner share.
1
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judgment the court has determined should not be awarded to him or her." Yim K. Cheung v.
Wing Ki Wu, 955 A.2d 746, 747 (Me. 2008) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., City ofAberdeen v.
Rich, 658 N.W.2d 775,781,783 (S.D. 2003) (" ... we find that the set-off should be deducted

from the award of gross-profits before ... post-judgment interest is calculated.").
One particularly illustrative case in this regard is Thomas & Betts Co., Inc. v. A & A
Mechanical, 2008 WL 2696877 (Ky. App. 2008). In that case, A & A obtained a judgment

against Thomas & Betts, but that judgment was overturned by an appeals court, partly because it
believed that an offset was in order. Id. at *2. As such, the matter was remanded to the trial
court for a new trial. As in the case at hand, this remand process apparently took some time-it
was about five years before the matter was heard again. In the second trial, the trial court
addressed the errors described by the appeals court and issued a final judgment for A & A. Id.
As suggested by the appeals court, the trial court also awarded a substantial offset in favor of
Thomas & Betts. Id. However, prior to effectuating that offset, it first awarded A & A its postjudgment interest for the five years between the first and second trial, meaning that A & A
essentially received five years of interest on its gross judgment of $366,000, even though it was
only being awarded a net judgment of $196,000. Id.
The appeals court reversed that ruling, however, finding that even though the two
jUdgments were rendered about five years apart, they should be set off against one another prior
to any retroactive post-judgment interest accruing. Id. at **2-3. Specifically, the court stated
that there is a "well-established legal principle that a judgment entered after remand should place
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each party in the position it would have been in had the trial court's original action been correct."
Id. As such, the court found that:

it was an error for the trial court to grant post-judgment interest on the original
erroneous judgment. ... Instead, in order to place the parties in the position they
would have been if the trial court had not erred, [the original jUdgment] should
have been offset. .. by the amount due on the purchase order to Thomas & Betts
before attaching post-judgment interest.
Id. (emphasis added).

The case at hand is similar. The judgments belonging to both St. AI's and MRIA relate
to the same nucleus of fact-i. e., the former partnership between them. And as in Thomas &

Betts, the only reason for the five-year delay between these two judgments was due to errors at
the first trial. It is accordingly both illogical and unfair to give St. AI's approximately five years
of post-judgment interest on its entire gross judgment before applying the offset, since the offset
is, by definition, proof positive that St. AI's was never entitled to the gross amount to begin with.
To paraphrase the Yim K Cheung decision, the trial court irrationally allowed St. AI's to "collect
interest on the part of the judgment [which it] has determined should not be awarded to [it]."
955 A.2d at 747. Consequently, as in Thomas & Betts, St. AI's original judgment should be
offset "by the amount due" to MRIA "before attaching post-judgment interest." 2008 WL
2696877 at **2-3.
The trial court, however, disagreed. While it was sympathetic to the logic behind this
argument, it nonetheless chose to give St. AI's its interest for five years prior to effectuating the
offset. R.,5030-32. Once again, the trial court's decision was based primarily on its belief that
St. AI's 2007 judgment had not been affected by the first appeal. Id. It found that its hands were
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tied because St. AI's was awarded its judgment in 2007, and MRIA did not receive its judgment
until 2012, and that as a result, St. AI's should receive interest for that five-year span. Id. The
trial court, however, was mistaken for at least two reasons.
The first has been dealt with twice herein: for the reasons detailed above, the trial court
was simply incorrect as to St. AI's 2007 judgment not being affected by the remand. St. AI's
judgment was overruled by association by this Court in SADC. Moreover, when this Court
vacated the judgment in SADC, by definition it vacated both parties' awards. As such, there was
no 2007 judgment. The trial court's sole rationale for not offsetting judgments and then
assessing interest (if any) accordingly lacks foundation.
Second, even if this were not the case, cases like Thomas & Betts have similar facts, but
do not find the disparity in time between judgments to be an issue to applying the offset prior to
interest being assessed. Indeed, in Thomas & Betts, as here, the two judgments in question were
rendered five years apart, and yet the court there did not find that time difference to be relevant
at all. The only question was whether the reason for the difference in time was due to a mistake
in the first court. Once that mistake was found, the goal was to "place each party in the position
it would have been in had the trial court's original action been correct." Thomas & Betts, 2008
WL 2696877 at **2-3. And at the risk of stating the obvious, giving St. AI's five years of costly
interest simply because its "damages" were allegedly determined first is not placing the "parties
in the position [they] would have been in had the original action been correct." To the contrary,
interest on money it was never entitled to would be nothing more than an unfair windfall for St.

CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 17

AI's, particularly given that it is the party who has twice been adjudged to have destroyed its
partner for its own gain.

IV.

The Trial Court Erred When It Granted Summary Judgment Against MRIA's
Claim that St. AI's Withdrawal from the Partnership Breached the Partnership
Agreement2
MRIA's Third Amended Counterclaim contained a claim that St. AI's breached the

MRIA partnership agreement when St. Ai's withdrew from the partnership. R.,85-114
(especially 105-06). As discussed above, Article 6.1 of the MRIA partnership agreement
addresses withdrawal. See Ex. 4023, § 6.1. And as this Court has already found, Article 6.1 was
ambiguous as to whether it limited St. AI's right to withdraw from the partnership, and therefore
was not an "express" provision for purposes of wrongful dissociation under I.C. § 53-3602(b)(1). SADC, 224 P.3d at 1076. As a result, it should have been ajury question as to
whether St. AI's breached the partnership agreement when it withdrew from the partnership. The
trial court, however, dismissed the claim, determining that "RUP A was intended to replace the
law of contract as applied to partnership dissociation." R., 1236-38. This decision should be
reversed.
The trial court erred when it determined that RUP A displaced common law claims for
withdrawal in breach of a partnership agreement because RUP A and the official comments
thereto make clear that although it grants the right to dissociate, it does not preclude a claim for
withdrawal in breach of the partnership agreement. Accordingly, the issue presently before this

Whether St. AI's wrongfully dissociated was one of several alternate theories alleged by MRIA.
As such, this argument only needs to be considered if the Court remands the case for a third trial.
2
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Court is whether RUP A's wrongful dissociation provisions, codified in the Idaho Code, were
intended to displace common law breach of contract claims.
"The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; those
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed
as a whole." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502 (2011). "Statutory
provisions should not be read in isolation but instead are interpreted in the context of the entire
document." Flying Elk Inv. v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 15,232 P.3d 330 (2010). Where a court is
required to engage in statutory construction, it may ascertain legislative intent from the statute's
context, the public policy in support of the statute, and the statute's legislative history. State v.
Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685 (1999).
In Idaho, a clear and specific legislative intent is required to override the common law.
Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 607,151 P.2d 765 (1944) (overruled on other grounds by
Doggett v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply, 93 Idaho 888, 890, 477 P.2d 511 (1970)). The legislative
intent to abrogate the common law must be expressly declared by clear and unambiguous
language:
It is not to be presumed that the Legislature intended to abrogate or modify a rule
of the common law by the enactment of a statute upon the same subject; it is
rather to be presumed that no change in the common law was intended, unless the
language employed clearly indicates such an intention. It has been said that
statutes are not presumed to make any alterations in the common law further than
is expressly declared, and that a statute, made in the affirmative without any
negative expressed or implied, does not take away the common law. The rules of
the common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication, nor overturned,
except by clear and unambiguous language.
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Cox v. St. Anthony Bank & Trust Co., 41 Idaho 776, 242 P. 785, 786 (1925); see also Chenery v.
Agri-Lines Corp., 115 Idaho 281, 285, 766 P.2d 751 (1988) ("unless explicit statutory language
abrogates ... common law concepts, they remain viable.")
Although many statutes contain explicit language abrogating the common law-see, e.g.,
I.C. § 6-803(3) ("The common law doctrine of joint and several liability is hereby limited to
causes of action [among tortfeasors],,) and I.C. § 54-2094 ("this act is intended to abrogate the
common law of agency as it applies to regulated real estate transactions")-RUP A does not
contain explicit language abrogating common law breach of contract claims. To the contrary,
RUP A provides the exact opposite: "[u ]nless displaced by particular provisions of this act, the
principles oflaw and equity supplement this act." I.e. § 53-3-104. Thus, intent to supplant the
common law cannot even be inferred from this statute.
The purpose of the wrongful dissociation section of RUPA contained in I.C. § 53-3-602
was to change the operation of the previous statutory scheme, the Uniform Partnership Act, by
permitting the continued operation of the business of the partnership even if one of the partners
withdrew from the partnership. I.C. § 53-3-601, official cmt. 1. The statute, in addition to
creating an immutable power to withdraw, also creates a category whereby that withdrawal is
classified as "wrongful." I.C. § 53-3-602(b). The official comment to RUP A regarding this
section provides that "[ s]ince subsection (b) is merely a default rule, the partnership agreement
may eliminate or expand the dissociations that are wrongful or modify the effects of wrongful
dissociation." I.C. § 53-3-602, cmt. 1 (emphasis added). Consistent with that comment, I.C. §
53-3-602( c) provides that liability for wrongful dissociation under RUPA "is in addition to any
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other obligation of the partner to the partnership or to other partners." The official comment
regarding section 602(c) provides "that liability is in addition to any other obligation of the
partner to the partnership or to the other partners. For example, the partner would be liable for
any damage caused by breach of the partnership agreement or other misconduct."

I.e. § 53-3-

602, cmt. 2. Accordingly, both RUPA itself and the official comments thereto make clear that
RUP A did not displace common law contract claims for withdrawal in breach of a partnership
agreement. 3 Therefore, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment dismissing
MRIA's contract claim for withdrawal in breach of the partnership agreement on the grounds
that RUP A eliminated such a claim. That decision should be reversed.

V.

The Trial Court Incorrectly Ruled that, as a Matter of Law, the Partnership
Agreement Could Not be for a Term or Particular Undertaking. 4
The trial court found at summary judgment that, as a matter of law, the MRIA

Partnership Agreement was not for a term or particular undertaking. R.,556-62. This finding
essentially eliminated one ofMRIA's main arguments concerning whether St. AI's act of
dissociation was wrongful. The trial court's decision was in error.

There is no indication that the legislature intended to immunize a dissociating partner from bad
faith conduct in the manner and method of its dissociation, which in tum terminally injures the
partnership. That, however, is exactly what Saint Alphonsus did in this case. It specifically
conducted itself in such a way as to insure that its nest would be feathered upon departure while
at the same time its soon to be competitor, rather than partner, MRIA would be destroyed and
unable to compete. See the "Statement of Facts" of the MRIA's Respondents' Brief at §§ I and
II, filed concurrently herewith.
4 As with the withdrawal issue above, whether the Partnership Agreement was for a term or
particular undertaking was one of several alternate theories alleged by MRIA. As such, this
argument only needs to be considered if the Court remands the case for a third trial.
3
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As this Court is aware, the standard for granting summary judgment based on the
interpretation of a contract is difficult to meet. This Court has held that:
When interpretation of the terms of a contract is called into question ... summary
judgment is appropriate only when the court finds the contract language to be
unambiguous as a matter oflaw. If relevant terms are ambiguous, the resolution
of the meaning of those ambiguous terms becomes one for determination by the
finder of fact, and summary judgment must be denied if there are disputed issues
of fact regarding the meaning of the ambiguous contract language.

Campagna v. Parker, 116 Idaho 734, 737, 779 P.2d 409,412 (1989) (emphasis added). Put
another way, the existence of any ambiguity is enough to hold the matter over for trial. Id.
Critically, the question of whether an ambiguity exists "presents a question of law" over which
this Court exercises "free review." Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 748,
9 P.3d 1204, 1214 (2000).
In this case, there was at the very least a jury question as to whether the partnership was
for a term or particular undertaking. Article 1.1.2 of the Partnership Agreement states:
If the Limited Partnership contemplated by Section 1.6 is formed and the limited
partnership interests sold, and/or other financing mutually acceptable to all
Partners to replace all or a portion of the funds which were to be acquired by the
limited partnership offering is acquired on or before December 31, 1985, then the
term of this Partnership shall end on the date which is within a reasonable time
after the business of the Partnership is wound up and dissolved under Article 10.
Ex. 4023, p. 1 (emphasis added). As the language of this section makes clear, the length of the
partnership is tied directly to the duration of the "business of the Partnership." This means, of
course, that if the "business of the Partnership" has a fixed duration, then the life of the
partnership will also be fixed. As such, the critical question becomes whether the "business of
the Partnership" has a fixed duration.
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It does. The Partnership Agreement expressly states that the purpose of the MRIA
partnership was to "organize and promote an Idaho limited partnership" and to operate and
manage medical diagnostic devices, including a magnetic resonance imaging device. Ex. 4023 at

§ 1.6. The Agreement further provides that when formed, these limited partnership(s) shall have
the same purpose as MRIA. Id. Moreover-and possibly most importantly-the only manner in
which the Partnership Agreement anticipates making any money is through the management of
the limited partnerships, a fact which this Court has already recognized. Ex. 4023, § 2; SADC,
224 P .3d at 1085. As such, the Agreement makes clear that MRIA' s sole purpose would be to
manage the affairs of the limited partnerships, and that MRIA would end when the limited
partnerships did.
This is crucial, because the limited partnerships had an expiration date. By agreement,
the two limited partnerships that MRIA was set up to run were to expire by their terms in
December 2015 and December 2018. Ex. 4024, § 1.1; Ex. 24, § 1.1. Thus, because the
"business of the [MRIA] Partnership" was defined to be coterminous with these limited
partnerships and because these limited partnerships had specific dates of termination, the MRIA
partnership was for a term or particular undertaking.
This analysis is clearly consistent with Idaho law, which specifically allows a partnership
for a term or particular undertaking to be established by proof that the "partnership will continue
for a definite term or until a particular undertaking is completed." I.C. § 53-3-101, cmt. In this
regard, the RUPA commentators have pointedly recognized that "[w]hether there exists an
agreed term or undertaking for a given partnership cannot always be resolved by reference to the
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written partnership agreement." RUPA, § 602, Authors' Comments 5a (emphasis added). That
is, the existence of a "term" partnership or partnership for a specific undertaking can be implied
and, therefore, requires consideration of documents, conduct, and statements outside the formal
partnership agreement. Id.; see also 68th Street Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546,
561-62, 362 A.2d 78, 87 (1976) (holding an agreement as to term may be express or implied);
Fischer v. Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98,102 (Ky. 2006). This is true even when there is a written
agreement. Id.; Mervyn Investment Co. v. Biber, 184 Cal. 637, 641-42, 194 P. 1037 (1921);
AMJUR CONTRACTS § 530 ("[w]here the time for a contract's duration is not specified, or
where the language in regard thereto lacks precision, the court may inquire into the intent of the
parties and supply the missing term, if duration may be fairly and reasonably fixed by the
surrounding circumstances and the parties' intent.") (emphasis added).
Besides this clear contractual language stating that the MRIA partnership would
terminate when the limited partnerships did, there were other indicia that the parties intended for
MRIA to be for a term or undertaking. For example, at the time St. Al's penned the agreement,
its drafting attorney specifically stated to all parties a few weeks prior to formation that they need
not worry about the absence of a "sunset clause" because "the life of this [MRIA] partnership
will undoubtedly be determined by the terms of the lease and the limited partnership." Ex. 12, p.
2 (emphasis added). In addition, it is undisputed that on October 11,1999, St. AI's board of
directors met and discussed the MRIA partnership and agreed to "[eJxtend[J the term of the MRI
partnership agreement to 12/31/23." Trial Ex. 4109, p. 1 (emphasis added). This is clear proof
that St. AI's considered the MRIA partnership to have a "term" that needed to be extended, since
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there would be no need to discuss "extending the term of the MRI partnership" ifit was simply
an at-will partnership.
The trial court seemed to agree with this logic, but nonetheless found against MRIA. It
stated that the foregoing argument would be "viable" but for the fact that Article 1.1.2 of the
Partnership Agreement refers to Article 10 of the agreement, and that Article 10.1 talks to a vote
for dissolution. R., 556-62. The trial court essentially held that since Article 10.1 requires a
vote, the fact that the language of Articles 1.1.2 and 1.6 state that the partnership will only exist
so long as the limited partnerships do is irrelevant. Id.
With all due respect to the trial court, however, this is just one possible interpretation of
the contract. Article 10.1 could be just as easily interpreted to be a provision for the parties to
use to end the partnership before the end of the term, with the understanding that without that
vote it would otherwise last for the term set out in Articles 1.1.2 and 1.6. Or it could simply
mean that as part of the winding up process, the partners needed to perfunctorily join together
and affirm that the term of the partnership had ended. Indeed, these interpretations would be
much more likely, given that the trial court's understanding reads the clearly-expressed term
language out of Article 1.1.2 and Article 1.6 entirely, and does so in spite this Court's
admonition to give meaning to all parts of a contract. See, e.g., Idaho Power, 9 P.3d at 1214.
Moreover, these interpretations would be consistent with the undisputed facts laid out above that:
(1) the drafter of the contract himself stated that the partnership agreement was for a term; and

(2) St. AI's privately acknowledged before this litigation that the agreement was for a term or
particular undertaking. Ex. 12, p. 2; Ex. 4109, p. 1.
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Put more simply, the trial court's interpretation is just one of several possible from the
face of the document. As such, the trial court's finding that its interpretation is the only one
possible as a matter of law is in error; there is at least an ambiguity here requiring a jury
decision. Indeed, the trial court's stated finding that reasonable minds could not differ on this
issue is demonstrably false, given that 12 presumptively reasonable jurors in the first trial were
allowed to see all this exact same evidence and unanimously came to the exact opposite
conclusion-that the partnership was, in fact, for a term. 2007 R., 2294 (2007 jury specifically
found that S1. AI's "breached the Partnership Agreement by dissociating before the end of the
partnership term."). The trial court's unnecessarily hasty decision to decide this as a matter of
law must accordingly be reversed.
VI.

The Trial Court Erred by Disallowing the Jury from Considering Damages Related
to IMPs Entry Into Eagle.
At trial, MRIA presented substantial unrebutted evidence that St. AI's and IMI usurped

MRIA's opportunity to go into the Eagle, Idaho market. See, e.g., Tr., 3905:5-3910:16. The trial
court, however, refused to allow the jury to consider the issue. Tr., 6068:24-6070: 10. It stated
that it would not allow damages related to IMI's operations in Eagle because IMI's facility did
not open until 2007: "opening the Eagle facility is too remote in time from both the dissociation
and the expiration of the non-compete obligation to find that damages, if found, may be awarded
for the Eagle facility profits that might have been realized by the MRI entities." Id. The trial
court's decision had serious financial effects-it essentially caused MRIA to reduce the damages
figure it presented to the jury by about $8 million. Compare Ex. 5078
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(~$60

million) with Ex.

5078-R (~$52 million). However, this decision not to allow the jury to consider this issue was
incorrect, for at least three interrelated reasons.

A.

There is Clear Evidence Demonstrating that but for St. AI's Bad Acts, MRIA
Would Have Been a Partner with IMI When It Went to Eagle.

First, contrary to the trial court's holding, the expiration of time does not change the fact
that there was convincing evidence presented at trial demonstrating that MRI would have gone to
Eagle but for St. AI's duplicitous acts. In particular, MRIA presented in painstaking detail that
Saint Alphonsus underhandedly usurped MRIA's ability to cooperatively partner with GSR in
the MRI ventures. That evidence has already been described in MRIA's "Respondents' Brief,"
and thus will not be fully rehashed here. Indeed, there is a massive amount of evidence that
MRIA and GSR were, in fact, close to a deal at the time St. AI's usurped the opportunity, even if
a few points remained to be negotiated. For example, in Ex. 4079, Dr. Hall ofGSR reports to
GSR in late spring of 1999 that "a partnership with MRI is very close to being finalized." Ex.
4079, p. 2 (~L) (emphasis added). In fact, GSR felt so confident about the finality ofa deal with
MRIA that it voted to "give the negotiating team discretion in finishing the negotiations." ld. In
addition, Dr. Prochaska ofMRIA-a major player in these negotiations-stated he thought a
deal was close to being done at the time. Tr., 251:13-254:5, 762:11-17; see also Tr., 950:2-8
(GSR's Jeff Cliff says he has no reason to dispute that GSR believed a deal with MRIA was
close to being finalized); Tr., 1249:7-1253:18 (Bruce admits that she was asked to step in to
finish up the MRIAJGSR deal); Tr., 4329:20-4334:2 (Dr. Giles stated that GSR always assumed
IMI would become part ofMRIA). Sadly, however, as set forth in Sections I and II of the
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Statement of Facts in MRIA's Respondents' Brief, St. AI's sabotaged MRIA's negotiations and
took MRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR.
Thus, had st. AI's not committed its multitudinous bad acts, the Eagle imaging facility
would have been an MRINIMI-owned facility, rather than an IMIISt. AI's-owned facility. That
is, there is no serious speculation that MRIA and GSR would have joined together in IMI but for
St. AI's venality, and there is no speculation that IMI went to Eagle. As such, by association, it
is also not speculative to say that ifMRIA and GSRjoined together, MRIA would have gone to
Eagle with IMI as well. At the very least, there was an open question as to that fact, one which
the jury should have been able to address. See Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 146 Idaho 613,
618,200 P.3d 1162 (2009) (evidence need only be "sufficient to remove the existence of
damages from the realm of speculation.").

B.

There is Significant Evidence Demonstrating that St. AI's Purposefully
Thwarted MRIA 's Efforts to Enter the Eagle Market While it Was a Partner.

Secondly, as noted above, Mobile's CEO, Jack Floyd, testified that he made a
presentation in 2001 to the MRIA board, which included St. AI's representatives, where he
described opportunities in both Eagle and Meridian. He explained that MRIA had a sense of
urgency about getting its Mobile operation into the Meridian and Eagle area, and that this had
also been communicated to St. AI's several times prior. Tr.,3905:5-3910:16. Significantly,
Mr. Floyd also testified that St. AI's was strongly opposed to such an expansion, and that MRIA
would not undertake any action that its partner, St. AI's, opposed. Tr., 3905:5-3917:2. This
position accords with other witnesses who testified that MRIA would never make any major
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moves like this without the agreement of the hospital partners. See, e.g., Tr., 182:11-183:4,
198:2-201:22 ("Sandra

L St. AI's CEO], we always do what the CEOs want. All you have to do

to .. .is tell the board what you want.").
In the past, St. AI's has countered that even ifSt. AI's had thwarted MRIA's growth into
the Eagle market while it was a partner, it stopped being a partner in the 2004-2005 timeframe,
and that MRIA could have expanded into Eagle after that point. The problem with this argument
is that by the time St. AI's withdrew, it had wounded MRIA so badly that it was no longer in the
position to take advantage of new opportunities, but instead was trying to salvage what remained.
Tr., 4032:25-4034:23 (Floyd recounts some of the efforts expended to win referrals back, but
describes MRIA in 2005 as "pretty much dead in the water."). Put another way-and as detailed
in much fuller detail in Respondents' Brief-St. Ai's did not just frustrate MRIA's attempts to
go into Eagle during the 2001-2004 timeframe, it also was stealing MRIA' s existing customers
behind its back during that same time so that when St. AI's was no longer a partner at MRIA,
MRIA had no ability to go to Eagle. Thus, the effort to keep MRIA out of Eagle did not start in
2007, but in 2001 (or earlier). 2007 was merely the culmination ofSt. AI's success in keeping
MRIA from entering the Eagle market. There is accordingly no justifiable reason to prohibit
damages based on those same acts.
Furthermore, the correct analysis is not whether MRIA was actually on the brink of
opening an Eagle facility, but rather, whether an Eagle MRI facility was within the scope of
MRIA's business. See Lifshutz v. Lifshutz, 199 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. App.-SanAntonio 2006) (when
it was undisputed that entity was engaged in the acquisition of rental properties, partner
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appropriated a partnership opportunity when he engaged in the acquisitions of rental properties);
Harestad v. Weitzel, 242 Or. 199,536 P.2d 522 (1975) (a real estate partnership could recover

profits from the sale of an apartment complex built by one of the partners in his individual
capacity because that kind of project had been within the scope of the partnership business).
Opening an MRI magnet in Eagle is within the line ofMRIA's business, and one that it had
actually discussed. It certainly had a reasonable business expectancy in serving the Eagle area.
No case law requires that MRIA have made an attempt to enter that market. MRIA has
presented sufficient evidence upon which the jury could reasonably determine that St. AI's either
usurped MRIA's ability to partner with IMI in an Eagle venture, or open its own Eagle facility.

C.

Eagle's Damages Are Not Too Remote Because St. AI's Eagle Usurpation
Began In 2001, Not 2007.

Third, the trial court ignored the fact that when IMI went into Meridian in 2001, it also
effectively went into Eagle at the same time. In particular, the trial court allowed evidence and
damages related to IMl's entry into Meridian (again, the evidence for which is detailed in
MRIA's Respondents' Brief at its Argument Section, § I(B». However, those same documents
and testimony make clear that when IMI went into Meridian in 2001, it did so knowing that it
was not just serving the Meridian market, but also was serving Eagle's as well.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence introduced at trial in this regard were IMl's profits
themselves. Ex. 5067; Tr., 4573:18-4575:20. The evidence showed that when Meridian
(sometimes referred to as "Magicview") opened, its profits increased to around $3.5 million a
year. Ex. 5067. However, once IMl's Eagle operation opened in 2007, IMl's business at
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MeridianiMagicview dropped to about half of what it was previously doing and the Eagle
location began doing almost the exact same amount of business as Meridian. Id In other words,
when IMI Eagle opened, it took about half ofIMI Meridian's business. Consistent with this
evidence, it was also unrebutted at trial that when IMI went to Meridian in 2001, it went with
two magnets, but when it opened up its Eagle office a few years later, it simply moved one of the
Meridian magnets to Eagle, rather than purchasing a third. Tr., 4549:24-4550:23.
The unmistakable conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that prior to the opening of
an office in Eagle, IMI was already servicing the Eagle clientele in Meridian, and that the
opening of Eagle simply meant that it was servicing that already-usurped clientele closer to their
homes. That is, if Meridian's profits dropped to about half of its historical amounts once Eagle
opened, and Eagle almost exactly made up that business, the only logical extrapolation that can
be drawn is that prior to the Eagle facility opening, the Eagle customers were simply traveling to
Meridian. Likewise, if two magnets were servicing Meridian residents alone, then IMI would
have purchased a third magnet for the Eagle location. The fact that IMI instead simply moved
one of the Meridian magnets to Eagle means that prior to that point, it was servicing Eagle
residents in Meridian. Given these obvious conclusions, it would be illogical indeed to cut off
the damages related to that 2001 Meridian usurpation-which was found by both the jury and the
trial court to have been unlawful-simply because IMI opened an office closer to these alreadystolen patients in Eagle. Again, at the very least, it should have been an issue the jury was
allowed to consider.
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In short, there was significant, non-speculative evidence strongly suggesting that MRIA
incurred serious damages related to Eagle as a result of St. AI's bad acts. The trial court's
decision to prohibit the jury from considering this evidence in its damages analysis was error.
ATTORNEY FEES ON CROSS-APPEAL

Because the gravamen of this case is a commercial transaction, MRIA requests its
attorneys' fees and costs on cross-appeal pursuant to LC. §12-120(3), Appellate Rules 40 and 41,
and all other applicable law.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, MRIA respectfully requests that this Court:
1.

Rule that St. AI's departing partner share is $863,040, without interest.

2.

Rule that St. AI's is not entitled to any interest on its judgment or, alternatively,

rule that the interest did not begin to run until judgment was actually entered in St. AI's favor in
January 2012 rather than 2007, and did so at the 2012 rate of interest, rather than at the 2007 rate.
3.

Rule that the trial court incorrectly performed its offset, and require a new

calculation which subtracts the departing partner share (in whatever the amount this Court
directs) from MRIA'sjudgments before assessing interest (if any).
4.

Reverse the trial court's decision dismissing MRIA's claim for withdrawal in

breach of the partnership agreement.
5.

Reverse the trial court's decision dismissing MRIA's claim for wrongful

dissociation before the end of the partnership term.
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6.

Reverse

trial court's decision to not allow damages related to

Eagle

operations.
7.

Award

notes

fees
conclusions 4

costs for

cross-appeal.
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5 only require a

judgment.)
2013.
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